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applies. 1 Introduction
The foundations of the theory of optimal income taxation were provided by
the theory of nonlinear taxation ￿rst developed by James Mirrlees (1971),
and the theory of linear taxation formulated by Eytan Sheshinski (1972).
In Mirrlees￿ s analysis, the problem is seen as one of mechanism design. An
optimally chosen menu of marginal tax rates and lump sum tax/subsidies
is o⁄ered, and individuals select from this menu in a way that reveals their
productivity type. As well as the government budget constraint therefore, a
key role is played by incentive compatibility or self selection constraints. In
Sheshinski￿ s linear tax analysis on the other hand, there is no attempt to solve
the mechanism design problem. All individuals are pooled, and the problem
is to ￿nd the optimal marginal tax rate and lump sum subsidy over the
population as a whole, subject only to the government budget constraint. In
each case, the theory provides an analysis of how concerns with the equity and
e¢ ciency of a tax system interact to determine the parameters of that system,
and in particular its marginal rate structure and degree of progressivity. As
Boadway (1998) points out, the optimal nonlinear tax is Pareto superior to a
linear tax for any given revenue requirement and set of consumers, implying
a superior tradeo⁄ between equity and e¢ ciency. Nevertheless, tax policy
makers or "central planners" do not seem to adopt the Mirrlees approach to
the design of tax systems in practice.
In reality most tax systems are neither linear in the sense of Sheshinski
nor nonlinear in the sense of Mirrlees, but rather piecewise linear. Gross
income is divided into (usually relatively few) brackets and marginal tax
rates are constant within but vary across these brackets.1 When we consider
formal income tax systems, the marginal tax rates are typically strictly in-
creasing with the income levels de￿ning the brackets. We refer to this case
of strict marginal rate progressivity as the convex case, since it de￿nes for
an income earner a convex budget set in the space of gross income-net in-
come/consumption. However, when we widen the de￿nition of the tax system
to include cash transfers that are paid and withdrawn as a function of gross
income we see that typically this may lead marginal tax rates to fall over some
range as gross income increases. Since this introduces nonconvexities into the
budget set income earners actually face, we refer to this as the nonconvex
1The German tax system is a rare exception to this. It has four brackets and in the
second and third of these marginal tax rates increase linearly with income. For further
discussion see Apps and Rees (2009a).
2case. The reason for planners￿preference for piecewise linear as opposed to
optimal nonlinear tax systems could be that the former overcome a large part
of the ine¢ ciency of a simple linear tax while remaining relatively simple to
implement.2 The present paper is concerned with the realistic case in which
policy makers are not trying to solve a mechanism design problem. It can
therefore be regarded as an extension of optimal linear taxation, rather than
a restricted or approximative form of optimal nonlinear taxation. As we see
below, interpretation of the results draws heavily on optimal linear taxation
theory.
The problem of the empirical estimation of labour supply functions when
a worker/consumer faces a piecewise linear budget constraint has been widely
discussed in the econometrics literature.3 Moreover, the literature4 on the
estimation of the marginal social cost of public funds has been concerned with
the deadweight losses associated with raising a marginal unit of tax revenue
in the context of some given piecewise linear tax system, which is assumed not
to represent an optimal tax system. Yet there is surprisingly little analysis
of the general problem of optimal piecewise linear income taxation. There
are two main papers in the theoretical literature on the continuum-of-types
case, by Sheshinski (1989) and Slemrod et al (1994).5 We believe these
papers leave the literature in a rather un￿nished state, despite the fact that
the paper by Slemrod et al gives a very thorough and insightful discussion of
the results of its simulation analysis of the nonconvex case, as well as of the
problem of piecewise linear taxation in a model consisting of only two types.
The contribution by Sheshinski was the ￿rst to formulate and solve the
problem of the optimal two-bracket piecewise linear tax system, including
the choice of the bracket threshold, for a continuum of worker/consumer-
types. However, he claims to have shown that, under standard assumptions,
marginal rate progressivity, the convex case, must always hold: in the social
2It could also be mentioned that the mechanism design approach does not extend
readily to deal with realistic aspects of tax systems, for example two-earner households
and multiple time periods. For further discussion of this see Apps and Rees (2009b).
3For a very extensive discussion see in particular Pudney (1989).
4See in particular Dahlby (1998).
5Strawczynski (1998) also considers the optimal piecewise linear income tax, but gross
income in his model is exogenous and attention is focussed, as in Varian (1980) on income
uncertainty, where taxation essentially becomes social insurance. Kesselman and Gar￿nkel
(1978) compare linear and piecewise linear tax systems in a two-type economy, taking
however the tax brackets as ￿xed. Sadka et al (1982) extend this to the case of a continuum
of types.
3optimum the tax rate on the higher income bracket must always exceed that
on the lower. Slemrod et al (1996) show that Sheshinski￿ s proof does not
hold in general because it ignores the existence of a discontinuity in the tax
revenue function in the nonconvex case. They then carry out simulations
which, using standard functional forms for the social welfare function, the
individual utility function and the distribution of wage rates/productivities,
in all cases produce the converse result - the upper-bracket marginal tax rate
is optimally always lower.
The result that a nonconvex system could be optimal should not be sur-
prising; for example it is foreshadowed by Sadka (1976), who established the
"no distortion at the top" result for optimal nonlinear taxation and provided
a strong intuition for why marginal tax rates could be lower at higher levels
of income. The fact that the nonconvex case6 always turns out to be opti-
mal is however also somewhat problematic, for two reasons. First, in general
non-parameterised models there is no reason to rule out the convex case, and
there is the possibility that the speci￿c functional forms and parameter val-
ues chosen by Slemrod et al for their simulations are biased toward producing
the nonconvexity result. Secondly, in practice, in virtually all countries, tax
systems do in fact exhibit a substantial degree of marginal rate progressivity.
It is as if tax policy makers when designing the formal tax system aim for a
basically convex system. However, adjustments are made, possibly by other
agencies of government, which relate to speci￿c income ranges, typically at
the low-to-middle end of the income distribution, and which have the ef-
fect of introducing nonconvexities. Leading examples are earned income tax
credit systems or "targeted" cash bene￿t payments which are withdrawn as
a function of gross income.
In this paper, we ￿nd it useful to separate the two types of system and
examine the conditions that characterise a system when it is optimal. We
provide a simple and transparent model which allows the characteristics of
each type of tax system, and particularly the optimal bracket thresholds, to
be easily seen and compared, and characterise for the ￿rst time the optimal
marginal tax rates in the nonconvex case.
6Which does however exhibit average tax rate progressivity.
42 Individual Choice Problems
We present ￿rst the analysis of the choice problems for the individual in the
face of respectively convex and nonconvex tax systems. In the next section
we discuss the optimal tax structures in each case.
Consumers have identical quasilinear utility functions7
u = x ￿ D(l) D
0 > 0; D
00 > 0 (1)
where x is consumption and l is labour supply. Gross income is y = wl;
with the wage rate w 2 [w0;w1] ￿ R+: Given a two-bracket tax system with
parameters (a;t1;t2; ^ y); with a the lump sum payment to all households, t1
and t2 the marginal tax rates in the ￿rst and second brackets respectively,
and ^ y the income level determining the upper limit of the ￿rst bracket, the
consumer faces the budget constraint
x ￿ a + (1 ￿ t1)y y ￿ ^ y (2)
x ￿ a + (t2 ￿ t1)^ y + (1 ￿ t2)y y > ^ y (3)
We assume a di⁄erentiable wage distribution function, F(w); with continuous
density f(w); strictly positive for all w 2 [w0;w1]:
2.1 Convex case: t1 ￿ t2
There are three solution possibilities:8
(i) Optimal income y￿ < ^ y: In that case we have the ￿rst order condition








De￿ning  (:) as the inverse function of D0(:); this yields
y
￿ = w ((1 ￿ t1)w) ￿ ￿(t1;w) (5)
7Thus we are ruling out income e⁄ects. This considerably clari￿es the results of the
analysis.
8It is assumed throughout that all consumers have positive labour supply in equilibrium.
It could of course be the case that for some lowest sub interval of wage rates consumers
have zero labour supply. We do not explicitly consider this case but it is not di¢ cult to
extend the discussion to take it into account.
5giving in turn the indirect utility function



















w2 > 0 (7)
We de￿ne the unique value of the wage type ~ w by
^ y = ￿(t1; ~ w) (8)
Note that w < ~ w , y￿ < ^ y; and @ ~ w=@^ y > 0:
(ii) Optimal income y￿ > ^ y: In that case we have










￿ = ￿(t2;w) (10)
and the indirect utility













= ￿(￿(t2;w) ￿ ^ y);
@v
@^ y
= (t2 ￿ t1) (12)
and dv=dw > 0 just as before. We de￿ne the unique wage type ￿ w by
^ y = ￿(t2; ￿ w) (13)
and we have w > ￿ w , y￿ > ^ y; and @ ￿ w=@^ y > 0:
(iii) Optimal income y￿ = ^ y: In that case the consumer￿ s indirect utility
is





















6To summarise these results: the consumers can be partitioned into three
subsets according to their wage type, denoted C0 = [w0; ~ w); C1 = [ ~ w; ￿ w];
C2 = (￿ w;w1]; with C ￿ C0 [ C1 [ C2 = [w0;w1]. C0 consists of consumers
in equilibrium at tangencies along the steeper part of the budget constraint,
C1 the consumers at the kink, and C2 the consumers at tangencies on the
￿ atter part of the budget constraint.9
Note that the consumers in C1; with the exception of type ~ w; are e⁄ec-
tively constrained at ^ y in the sense that they would prefer to earn extra gross
income if it could be taxed at the rate t1; since D0(
^ y
w) < (1￿t1)w; but since
it would in fact be taxed at the higher rate t2; they prefer to stay at ^ y: Given
the continuity of F(w); consumers are continuously distributed around this
budget constraint, with both maximised utility v and gross income y continu-
ous functions of w: v is strictly increasing in w for all w; and y￿ is also strictly
increasing in w except over the interval C1: Finally, note that if t1 = t2, C1
shrinks to a point.
2.2 Nonconvex case: t1 > t2
Here there are again three solution possibilities. Given ^ y; a; t1 and t2, with
t1 > t2; there is a unique consumer type denoted by ^ w; the solution to the
equation
(1 ￿ t1)￿(t1;w) ￿ D(
￿(t1;w)
w




where ￿(:) has the same meaning as before. In equilibrium this type is
indi⁄erent between the two tax brackets. Note that
￿(t1; ^ w) < ^ y < ￿(t2; ^ w) (17)
and that @ ^ w=@^ y > 0: The income of consumers in [w0; ^ w) is ￿(t1;w) and in
(￿ w;w1] is ￿(t2;w). They pay taxes of t1￿(t1;w) and t2￿(t2;w) + (t1 ￿ t2)b y
respectively.
For individuals of type ^ w, the tax payments at the two local maxima
are respectively t1￿(t1; ^ w) and [t2(￿(t2; ^ w) ￿ b y) + t1b y] > t1￿(t1; ^ w). In this
case, although maximised utility is a continuous function of w over [w0;w1],
optimal gross income and the resulting tax revenue are not. There is an
upward jump in both at ^ w: Tax paid by a consumer of type ^ w if she chooses
9We assume that the tax parameters are such that none of these subsets is empty.
7to be in the higher tax bracket is always higher than that if she chooses the
lower bracket, even though the tax rate in the latter is higher. Since however
consumers of type ^ w are a set of measure zero, their choice of gross income
is of no consequence for social welfare or tax revenue. Nevertheless, this
discontinuity will play an important role in the optimal tax analysis, as we
see in the next section.
Consumers with wages in [w0; ^ w) have indirect utilities











and for those in (^ w;w1];













= ￿(￿(t2;w) ￿ ^ y);
@v
@^ y
= (t2 ￿ t1) < 0 (21)
We can now turn to the optimal tax analysis.
3 Optimal Taxation
3.1 The optimal convex tax system
We assume that the optimal taxation system is convex. The planner chooses







S[v(a;t1; ^ y;w)]dF +
Z
C2
S[v(a;t1;t2; ^ y;w)]dF (22)
where S(:) is a continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly concave and increasing









[t2￿(t2;w)+(t1￿t2)^ y]dF ￿a￿G ￿ 0 (23)
8where G ￿ 0 is a per capita revenue requirement.






￿ 1)dF = 0 (24)
where ￿ is the shadow price of tax revenue.11 This is essentially the same
condition as for linear taxation. The marginal social utility of income aver-
aged across the population is equated to the marginal social cost of public
expenditure, implying that the dollar value of this average marginal social
utility is equated to the dollar marginal cost of expenditure, which is 1. The
￿rst term in the brackets is a money measure of the marginal social utility
of income to a consumer of type w:
It is useful for later discussion to have the following












￿ 1)f(w)dw < 0 for ￿ 2 (w0;w1] (26)
Proof : Since S0(v(w)) is continuous and monotonically decreasing in
w;(24) implies that there exists w￿ 2 (w0;w1) such that S0(v(w￿)) ￿ ￿ = 0;
S0(v(w)) ￿ ￿ > 0; for w 2 [w0;w￿); and S0(v(w)) ￿ ￿ < 0; for w 2 (w￿;w1]:













which gives the result.
Assuming an interior solution with t1 < t2; the condition characterising
the optimal lower bracket tax rate yields
10In deriving these conditions, it must of course be taken into account that the limits
of integration ~ w and ￿ w are functions of the tax parameters. Because of the continuity of
utility, optimal gross income and tax revenue in w; these e⁄ects all cancel and the ￿rst
order conditions reduce to those shown here.
11Or the marginal social cost of public expenditure. Needless to say, if we assume that
the planner has optimised the tax system, the problem of estimating this paramer becomes















The denominator, which is negative, can be interpreted as the e¢ ciency e⁄ect
of the tax. The numerator is the equity e⁄ect. Using the above lemma it can
be shown that this numerator is also negative and so the tax rate is positive.
Thus, given C0 = [w0; ~ w) and ￿(t￿
1;w) ￿ ^ y￿ < 0 in this interval, ~ w ￿ w￿
gives the result immediately. If ~ w > w￿; since (S0(v(w)) ￿ ￿)f(w) > 0 and
￿(t￿
1;w) < ￿(t￿

















while (S0(v(w))￿￿)f(w) < 0 and ￿(t￿
1;w) > ￿(t￿
































0(v(w)) ￿ ￿)dF > 0
(31)
as required.
An interesting aspect of this condition is that t1 is set in the light of its
e⁄ects only on e¢ ciency and income distribution within the subset C0; in a
way that is analogous to12 the setting of a linear tax on a population as a
whole, even though it also a⁄ects utility and tax burdens of the consumers
in C1 and C2: The reason for this is that in both these subsets, the e⁄ect of a
change in t1 on utility (￿^ y￿) is the negative of its e⁄ect on tax revenue (^ y￿).
The ￿rst order condition determining t￿
























Using (24) then gives Result 2.
12But not identical to, since the numerator term is not the covariance of the marginal
















1;w) ￿ ^ y￿ > 0 and is increasing in w; and the numerator here
can also be shown to be negative, along the same lines as for t￿
1. Again, the
optimal tax rate for the subgroup C2 is determined (given ^ y￿) entirely by
the characteristics of the wage types in this group. Thus, given the optimal
choice of tax brackets, the optimal tax rates are set as optimal linear taxes
over the sub-populations strictly within each bracket.
Since in the convex case we must have t￿
1 < t￿
2; we see that this case is
likely to be globally optimal the greater the aggregate deadweight e¢ ciency
loss within the C0 group relative to that in the C2 group, and the more
powerful the marginal tax rate is as a redistributive instrument within the
C2 group relative to the C0 group, given of course the optimal choices of
a and ^ y: Note that the proportion of the consumers falling into group C1; R
C1 dF , plays no direct role in determining these tax rates. It does however
of course in￿ uence the choice of ^ y.
Result 4:



















The left hand side gives the marginal social bene￿t of a relaxation of the
constraint on the consumer types in C1 who are e⁄ectively constrained by
^ y: First, for w 2 (~ w; ￿ w] the marginal utility with respect to a relaxation of
the gross income constraint is v^ y = (1 ￿ t1) ￿ D0(
^ y
w) 1
w > 0; as shown earlier.
This is weighted by the marginal social utility of income to these consumer
types. Moreover, since they increase their gross income, this increases tax
revenue at the rate t￿
1: The right hand side is positive and gives the marginal
social cost of increasing ^ y; thus, since t￿
2 > t￿
1; reducing the tax burden on
the higher income group. This can be thought of as equivalent to giving a
lump sum payment to higher rate taxpayers proportionate to the di⁄erence in
marginal tax rates, and this is weighted by a term re￿ ecting the net marginal
social utilities of income to consumers in this group. A necessary condition





￿ dF < 1, so that the
marginal social utility of the upper bracket consumers is on average below
11the population average. The planner then su⁄ers a distributional loss from
giving this group a lump sum income increase. Sheshinski argued that if
t￿
2 < t￿
1 the term on the right hand side of (34) must be negative, yielding a
contradiction, and therefore ruling out the possibility of nonconvex taxation.
However, because of the discontinuity in the tax revenue function in the
nonconvex case, this is not the appropriate necessary condition in that case,
as was pointed out by Slemrod et al.
We can obtain more intuition on these results by considering Figure 1.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 illustrates the comparison between the optimal linear tax and
the optimal convex two-bracket tax. The line aLL represents the budget con-
straint facing all consumers under the optimal linear tax, aCCD that under
the optimal piecewise linear tax. One budget constraint cannot lie entirely
above the other over the relevant domain of y-values since this would im-
ply that one of them violates the government budget constraint. Thus there
must be at least one intersection point within the domain of y-values. Special
cases can be constructed in which there might be only one intersection, but
here we consider the case of two such points, at A and B; with aC < aL:
The essential feature of the illustration is that the piecewise linear tax
system redistributes welfare away from the ends towards the middle: all
consumers of wage types in the interval (wA;wB) are strictly better o⁄under
the piecewise linear tax, those in [w0;wA) and (wB;w1] are strictly worse o⁄.
All consumers in the lower tax bracket under the piecewise linear tax will
expand their (compensated) labour supplies, all those in the higher bracket
will contract theirs, as compared to the linear tax. Conditions that would
tend to make the convex piecewise linear tax globally optimal therefore would
be a marginal social utility of income that falls slowly over the low and
middle income ranges and then then quickly over the upper income range,
and substantially higher compensated labour supply elasticities in the middle
income range.Note that we cannot rule out the case in which aC ￿ aL; in
which the lowest income group would not be made worse o⁄, but clearly there
would have to be a compensatingly heavier burden on the upper tax bracket.
123.2 The optimal nonconvex tax system















[t2￿(t2;w) + (t1 ￿ t2)^ y]dF ￿ a ￿ R ￿ 0 (36)
where it has to be remembered that indirect utility is continuous in w; but
that there is a discontinuity in tax revenue at ^ w:
From (16)-(21) it is easy to see that a change in a does not a⁄ect the
value13 of ^ w; and so the ￿rst order condition with respect to a is just as






￿ 1)dF = 0 (37)
However, for each of the remaining tax parameters the discontinuity in gross
income will be relevant, because a change will cause a change in ^ w; the type
that is just indi⁄erent to being in either of the tax brackets.
Now de￿ne
￿R = [t2￿(^ w;t2) ￿ (t2 ￿ t1)b y] ￿ t1￿(^ w;t1) > 0 (38)
This is the value of the jump in tax revenue that takes place at ^ w:
From the ￿rst order conditions for the above problem, we then have
Result 5:
The condition with respect to the optimal bracket value b y is
@ ^ w
@b y









It can be shown that @ ^ w=@b y > 0; and, on the same arguments as used be-
fore, but with (t2 ￿ t1) < 0; the right hand side is also positive. Thus, there
is nothing a priori to rule this case out, contrary to Sheshinski￿ s assertion.
The intuition is straightforward. The right hand side now gives the marginal
bene￿t of an increase in b y to the planner, namely a lump sum reduction in
13Note the usefulness of the quasilinearity assumption in this respect.
13the net income of higher bracket consumers with, on average, below-average
marginal social utility of income. The marginal cost of this is a jump down-
ward in tax revenue from consumers who now ￿nd the ￿rst tax bracket better
than the second. More precisely, a discrete increase ￿b y would cause a dis-
crete interval of consumers to jump down into the lower bracket, and, in
the limit, as ￿b y ! 0; the resulting revenue loss is given by ￿Rf(^ w): Both
marginal bene￿t and marginal cost are positive.
Result 6:












The new element here, as compared to the convex case, is the second term
in the numerator, which, since @ ^ w=@t1 < 0, is also negative. Thus this term
acts to increase the absolute value of the numerator, and therefore the value
of t1; as compared to the convex case. The intuition for this term is simply
that an increase in t1 expands the subset of consumers who prefer to be in
the upper tax bracket (with the lower tax rate) and so causes an upward
jump in tax revenue, equal in the limit, as the change in t1 goes to zero, to
￿Rf(^ w).
Result 7:












Again the new element here is the second term in the numerator, which,
since @ ^ w=@t2 > 0; is positive. Thus this tends to reduce the tax rate in the
upper bracket as compared to the convex case. The intuition for this term
is that an increase in t2 widens the subset of consumers who prefer to be in
the lower bracket, and so causes a downward jump in tax revenue. This then
makes for a lower tax rate in the upper income bracket.
The existence of the discontinuity terms in these expressions adds a new
element to the discussion of the optimal tax parameters. Since t￿
1 > t￿
2; their
presence, other things equal, makes for a widening in the gap between the
two tax rates. The in￿ uence of the other terms in the conditions is the same
as in the discussion of the convex case.
14Figure 2 about here
In Figure 2 we compare the optimal linear and nonconvex piecewise linear
tax systems. The budget constraint corresponding to the linear tax is again
aLL; that of the piecewise linear tax is aNEF: Thus we see that as compared
to the linear tax the nonconvex piecewise linear tax redistributes welfare
from the middle towards the ends.14 Lower bracket consumers, who now
pay a higher marginal rate, reduce their labour supplies and gross incomes,
higher bracket consumers do the reverse.
4 Conclusions
Given its signi￿cance in practice, the piecewise linear tax system seems to
have received disproportionately little attention in the literature on optimal
income taxation. This paper o⁄ers a simple and transparent analysis of its
main characteristics. We have considered only the two bracket case, but it is
easy to see how this can be extended to an arbitrary number of brackets. It
is quite possible in this case that some portions of the tax system might be
convex and some nonconvex, in a way that depends on the income distribu-
tional preferences of the tax policy maker and the way in which labour supply
elasticities vary with wage type. The question of the optimal determination
of the number of brackets is left open. Note, however, that we are not trying
to ￿nd the best piecewise linear approximation to a nonlinear tax function
that is optimal in the sense of Mirrlees. Rather, we start from the position
that it is practical only to pool all consumer types. Given the complexity
of the situation which faces the design of tax systems, this may be the only
feasible approach.
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